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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
This is an appeal from the Order of the District Court for 
Salt Lake County, Judge Pat B. Brian, upholding the Final Order 
of the Utah Securities Advisory Board and the Executive Director 
of the Department of Business Regulation suispending all secondary 
trading exemptions of Amenity, Inc. stock. Jurisdiction is 
vested in the Utah Court of Appeals pursuadt to §78-2a-3(2)(a) 
Utah Code 1977-1988, as an appeal from a District Court review of 
a final order of a state agency. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The issues presented by this appeal ai?e: 
1. Whether the statute prohibiting s^les of securities 
without registration with the Utah Securities Division (&61-1-7 
Utah Code 1987-1988) also prohibits gifts. That is, is a "gift" 
a "sale" within the meaning of said statute? 
2. Whether the gifts of stock in Amehity, Inc. made by 
appellant were made in good faith or bad f^ith. 
3. Whether the respondents properly applied their statutory 
authority in issuing the Final Order. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE: §61-1-7 Utafr Code 1987-1988 
"It is unlawful for any person to offfer or sell any securi-ty 
in this state unless it is registered undelr this chapter or the 
security or transaction is exempted under Section 61-1-14." 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case, This is an appeal from District Court 
review of administrative agency action. 
Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below. On June 5, 
1986/ the Utah Securities Division (the "Division") brought an 
action before itself pursuant to §61-1-14(3) of the Utah Uniform 
Securities Act (the "Act") to revoke all trading exemptions of 
Amenity, Inc. under said §61-1-14 (R. 73,74). Said petition 
alleged in substance that appellant had made a distribution of 
Amenity, Inc. stock in violation of §61-1-7, quoted above, and 
that such was done tor the purpose of evading the registration 
requirements of the Act (R. 73,74). 
The matter was set for hearing on June 19, 1986, (R. 75) at 
which time it was agreed between the parties that the facts were 
not in dispute and that the matter would be submitted on legal 
briefs on the following stipulated facts (R , see footnote 1, 
following page): 
1. Amenity, Inc. ("the company") was incorporated on 
January 7, 1986, with capitalization of 100,000,000 shares 
of $0,001 par value. 
2. On January 8, 1986, 1,000,000 shares were issued 
to appellant Capital General Corporation ("CGC") for a 
consideration of $2,000.00 cash. As of that date, CGC was 
the only shareholder of the company. 
3. CGC is a financial consulting firm, incorporated 
in 1971, and has numerous contacts, customers, former 
customers, business associates, etc. in the financial 
world. 
4. CGC gave 100 shares each out of its 1,000,000 
shares of the company's stock to approximately 90U of such 
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c o n t a c t s , cus tomers , e t c . Persons or e n t i t i e s who 
rece ived the g i f t s were s e l e c t e d a t random and inc luded 
sha r eho lde r s of such c o n t a c t s , cus tomers , e t c . and persons 
who formerly had no d i r e c t or i n d i r e c t c o n t a c t with CGC. 
No r e g i s t r a t i o n s t a tement for the g i f t q d sha res was f i l e d . 
5. Although a prime reason for making the g i f t s was 
t h e rewarding of p a s t a s s o c i a t i o n and l o y a l t y and the 
genera l exposure of CGC's f i n a n c i a l consu l t i ng bus ines s t o 
persons in the f i n a n c i a l world, o r , in o t h e r words, the 
c r e a t i o n and/or maintenance of goodwi l l , no c o n s i d e r a t i o n 
or payment of any kind for the s tock was s o l i c i t e d or 
accep ted . That i s , i t was s t r i c t l y a f ree and bona f i a e 
g i f t , no s t r i n g s a t t a c h e d . The r e c i p i e n t s did not have to 
buy any th ing , become a customer of CGC| f i l l out a 
q u e s t i o n n a i r e or pay or provide any c o n s i d e r a t i o n a t a l l , 
and they were f ree t o r e j e c t the g i f t s if they d e s i r e d . 
At sa id hear ing on June 19, 1986 i t was s t i p u l a t e d t h a t the 
i s s u e s in the case were s o l e l y i s s u e s of law and r e l a t e d to now 
the above quoted §61-1-7 and r e l a t e d p r o v i s i o n s of the Act 
i The respondents recorded the two subsequent hearings referred to below, 
but they failed to record the f i r s t hearing on June 19, 1986, at which the 
stipulation was made and the stipulated facts were received in written form. 
Appellant discovered only two days before i t s brief was due that portions of 
the record below occurring after said nonrecorded hearing, but establishing 
said stipulation, have been omitted by the Clerk of the District Court, 
presumably inadvertantly. Rather than seek a continuance to allow time to 
rectify the problem, i t was decided to write this footnote of explanation 
inasmuch as appellant does not believe respondents will deny their stipulation 
in their brief. This is because (1) to do so would throw yet another error in 
the proceedings below inasmuch as i t was respondents1 responsibility to record 
the hearing, and appellant has relied on said stipulation in subsequent hear-
ings, (2) respondents have not denied the stipulation in any of the several 
proceedings and filings since said hearing, and (3)1 i t appears from respon-
dents arguments below that they yet feel entitled to have the judgment below 
affirmed as a mattter of law based on the stipulated facts, either alone or 
with additional facts subsequent to said hearing. Should appellants belief be 
in error, i .e . should respondents deny having entered into the stipulation on 
June 19, 1986, appellant will request the Clerk of !the District Court to 
certify the missing portions of the record and will supplement this brief to 
provide the appropriate references to the record. 
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applied to the above facts. The parties submitted briefs and the 
matter was set down for further argument in September 1986, and 
in October 1986 the administrative law judge, Honorable J. Steven 
Ecklund, issued his findings and conclusions and recommended 
order (included in addendum) that the petition of respondents1 be 
denied and dismissed "there being no proper basis to conclude 
that the registration requirements mandated by Section 61-1-7 are 
applicable to the disposition of the securities in question." 
(R. 31). 
Respondent regulatory agencies were naturally disappointed 
in Judge Ecklund's recommended order dismissing their petition 
and therefore caused further review of said order and further 
factual hearing before the Utah Securities Advisory Board on 
January 20, 1987, (R. 25) at which time they were successful in 
persuading their advisory board to overrule Judge Ecklund and 
find and conclude and rule that the gifts of stock by appellant 
violated §61-1-7. Based thereon, respondents issued the Final 
Order of suspension (R. 16-20). 
Thereafter, appellant filed a petition with the District 
Court for Salt Lake County seeking a review of said Final Order 
(R. 2-8). The District Court having upheld said Final Order, 
appellant has appealed to the Court of Appeals. 
Facts. As of the date of respondent's petition, June 5, 
1986, and the hearing thereon, June 19, 1986, the above stipu-
lated facts constituted all of the facts of the case. Subsequent 
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to said date, appellant conducted further activity with respect 
to Amenity, Inc., including the rendering of assistance for a fee 
(R. 118, page 57) in causing an infusion of assets into (R. 118, 
page 19), and the acquisition of control of,t the corporation by 
third parties. Appellant does not believe facts developed 
subsequent to the said June 1986 petition and hearing are incon-
sistent with or change the legal effect of the above stipulated 
facts (see footnote 2 on page 18) and therefore will not itemize 
them further at this time. Undoubtedly respondents will 
emphasize in their brief those facts they teel are most 
important, but essentially the facts are not in dispute. What is 
in dispute is the conclusions of respondents in the Final Order 
with respect to the facts. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Distirct Court summarily and without listing any find-
ings or reasons for its ruling, upheld the Final Order of the 
respondents1 suspending all secondary trading exemptions (R. 107, 
108). Appellant believes that the District Court's said order 
should be reversed because it is contrary to the statutes and 
unsupported by the evidence adduced in the administrative 
hearings. This can be summarized in three main areas, any one of 
which is sufficient to require reversal of, the order, as follows: 
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1. "Gift" v, "Sale," The plain meaning of tne statute 
(§61-1-7 Utah Code 1987-1988) clearly limits its application only 
to sales. Appellant acknowledges that it did not register the 
shares ot stock that it gave away, but the wording of the 
statute, both by the plain meaning and import of the terms used 
(it uses "sale" and "sell," not "give" or "gift"), and the 
purposes of the securities laws (to protect people who pay money 
or other consideration for securities) is clearly against the 
interpretation placed on it by the respondents. 
It is appellant's position that because the Act, and in 
particular the section quoted above, is limited by its terms to 
situations involving sales, the Division and the Act have no 
power or application whatsoever relating to the giving of the 
gifts by appellant. Therefore respondents' order suspending 
trading of the gifted shares based upon the alleged wrongful act 
in the giving of the shares must be set aside and reversed as a 
matter of law. 
Appellant acknowledges that once the shares have been gifted 
that the Act would apply to subsequent transfers of such shares, 
i.e., that any subsequent trades would have to comply with the 
provisions of the Act and the respondents' rules with respect to 
secondary trading. However, respondents' petition and order is 
not brought or based on violation of the secondary trading rules, 
but is founded solely on respondents' allegations that the gifts 
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were in violation of the statutory prohibition against sales of 
unregistered stock. Since there were no sales, the order should 
be reversed. 
2. Bad Faith vs. Good Faith Gifts. Even if tne term "sale" 
does include the term "gift/1 §61-1-1 3( 1 5) (cl) ( i) specifically 
exempts a good faith gift. It would seem obvious that any gift, 
a good faith gift or a bad faith gift, is still a gift, i.e., not 
a sale and therefore not covered by the Act. Whether or not 
there is even such a thing as a bad faith gift is open to ques-
tion (it is not mentioned or defined in the, Act and it is other-
wise unfamiliar terminology). But if it is assumed for a minute 
as argued by respondents that a bad faith gift is a sale, the 
Order entered below should nevertheless be overruled because, in 
fact, the gifts made by appellant were good faith gifts. This is 
shown in that a) the original stipulated facts when it was agreed 
to submit the matter solely on a question of law state that the 
gifts were "bona fide gifts," b) the administrative law judge's 
findings and conclusion state that the gifts were made in good 
faith (R. 31), and c) the facts adduced at the final hearing 
subsequent to the administrative law judge's findings and con-
clusions, held January 20, 1987, again shofv clearly that Capital 
General Corporation took every reasonable step to comply with the 
law and acted in good faith in every way (R. 11b). 
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3. Respondents Exceeded Their Authority, Respondents have 
exceeded their statutory authority in any event. Respondents1 
authority is contained in §61-1-14(3). This section grants 
respondents the authority to revoke secondary trading exemptions 
granted by statute only if the the person seeking the exemption 
has failed to come within the statutorily defined criteria for 
the exemption. It does not grant authority to revoke exemptions 
which have not been claimed, nor does it allow revocation based 
on grounds outside of said §14. Respondents1 petition and order 
violate both of these statutory limitations on their authority. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. RESPONDENTS1 FINAL ORDER AND THE ORDER OF THE 
DISTRICT COURT SHOULD BE SET ASIDE ON THE GROUND 
THAT AS A MATTER OF LAW §7 OF THE UTAH UNIFORM 
SECURITIES ACT APPLIES ONLY TO SALES OF SECURITIES 
AND NOT TO GIFTS OF SECURITIES. 
Section 7 is quoted above on page 2. Simply stated, it is 
appellant's position that since the legislature limited the 
application of the statute to situations involving the selling of 
securities, the action of respondent regulatory agencies in 
applying it to the giving of securities is gross error. 
The matter is so simple, it would seem it would require no 
argument. Everyone surely has been aware ever since grammar 
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school that "sale" and "gift" do not mean th|e same thing, but 
connote totally different concepts. These words are practically 
as common in usage and understanding as "ye£" and "no." Even so, 
the legislature defined "sell" or "sale" in the Act (§61-1-13 
(15)(a)) as a disposition "for value," which, as one would 
predict for such a commonly used and understood word, is 
identical to the dictionary definition and the common accepted 
usage. Although "gift" is not defined in the statute it is no 
less well understood. 
That words used in statutes are to be bonstrued according to 
their plain meaning is likewise such a simple and universally 
established principle as to require no argument. Nevertheless, a 
few citations follow: 
Section 68-3-11 Utah Code 1987-1988: 
Words and phrases are to be constjrued according to 
the context and approved usage of the language; but 
technical words and phrases, and such others as have 
acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in law, or 
are defined by statute, are to be construed according 
to such peculiar and appropriate meaning or definition. 
"Sell" is not a peculiar or technical word, and the definition in 
the statute is totally consistent with the plain meaning and 
approved usage in the language. 
Gord v. Salt Lake City, 434 P.2d 449 (Utah 1967) at 451: 
The statute should not be stricken down nor 
applied other than in accordance with its literal word-
ing unless it is so unclear or confused as to be wholly 
beyond reason, or inoperable, or it contravenes some 
basic constitutional right. If it meets these tests it 
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is not the court's prerogative to consider its wisdom, 
or its effectiveness, nor even the reasonableness or 
orderliness of the procedure set forth, but it has a 
duty to let it operate as the legislature has provided. 
There is nothing about the word "sell" which is unclear, 
confused, inoperable, beyond reason, etc. On the contrary, it is 
totally clear and fits totally within the scheme and purpose of 
securities regulation, i.e., to protect purchasers of stock. 
Patrolmen's Benevolent Association v. City of New York, 3 59 
N.E.2d 1338 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1976) at 1341: 
Hence, where as here the statute describes the 
particular situations in which it is to apply, "an 
irrefutable inference must be drawn that what is 
omitted or not included was intended to be omitted or 
excluded." (McKinney's Constitutional Laws of N.Y., 
Book 1, Statutes, §240). 
Had the Utah Legislature intended the prohibition respecting 
sales of securities in §7 to also apply to gifts of securities, 
it would have been an easy thing for the legislature to have 
included gifts as well as sales in the wording of the statute. 
However, having described "the particular situation in which it 
is to apply," i.e. sales, an irrefutable inference must be drawn 
that it was intended to omit gifts. 
Finger Lakes Racing Association v. New York State Racing, 
382 N.E.2d 1131 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1978) at 1135: 
Courts are constitutionally bound to give effect to the 
expressed will of the Legislature and the plain and 
obvious meaning of the statute is always preferred to 
any curious, narrow or hidden sense that nothing but a 
strained interpretation of legislative intent would 
discern (Citations). 
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It is an elementary principle of [statutory con-
struction that courts may only look behind the words of 
a statute when the law itself is doubtful or ambiguous 
(Citations), If, as here, the terms of a statute are 
plain and within the scope of legislative power, it 
declares itself and there is nothing left for interpre-
tation. To permit a court to say that the law must 
mean something different than the common import of its 
language would make the judicial superior to the legis-
lative branch of government and practically invest it 
with lawmaking power. 
Appellant would add to the above and say that to permit the 
respondents to say that §7 of the Act mean^ something different 
than the common import of its language would make the respondent 
regulatory agencies superior to the legislature; and that surely 
it is obvious that what respondents have done is "nothing but a 
strained interpretation of the legislative intent..." in issuing 
their Final Order in this matter. 
There are hundreds of precedents all over the country which 
have held similar to the above authorities^ and it serves no pur-
pose to burden this brief with dozens more appellate court cita-
tions to the same obvious effect. Inasmuch as the District Court 
failed to list any findings, conclusions ot reasons for its 
ruling upholding the respondents1 Final Order, appellant does not 
know why the District Court did not adopt ^hese well known 
doctrines of statutory construction. However, the record at the 
agency level indicates that the rationale for the Final Order is 
to the effect that appellant's gifts to approximately 900 donees, 
which admittedly were gifts from the standpoint of the donee 
(i.e. they were not asked to, nor did they|, give any value for 
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the stock they received) , were not gifts from the standpoint of 
appellant because appellant obtained some value from having made 
the gifts, e.g., valuable goodwill and cash for services in 
connection with ongoing activities of the company. 
In a nutshell, it appears the claim of respondents is that 
appellant's "gifts" are in fact "sales" because of the profit, 
potential or actual, which has or may become available to 
appellant from having made the gifts. No doubt this line of 
reasoning is deemed advisable because of the obvious difficulty 
in getting around appellant's plain meaning arguments ana 
irrefutable authorities cited above. However, appellant 
respectfully submits that it just won't work. Such line of 
reasoning is still totally inconsistent with the well established 
plain meaning doctrine and the above cited authorities and is 
merely a play on words in an attempt to get around the said 
authorities without having to challenge their obvious 
correctness. Consider the following simple illustration: 
Labeling a chicken a duck does not make it so, even though 
both are birds and one can point out many similarities between 
them, such as size, feathers, walk, etc. In the same way, both 
gifts and sales are transfers of property and there are many 
similarities between them, as for example, in Doth cases the 
transferor receives something from having made the transfer. In 
the case of a gift the transferor may receive goodwill, perhaps 
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greater loyalty from the giftee, an opportunity for profitable 
business in the future, or just a good feeling, etc. There is no 
such thing as a gift that does not provide Something for the 
giver. The obvious reason that a sale is different is that a 
sale connotes a bargain, i.e., a contractually agreed upon 
consideration. This is the common and accepted usage and is 
identical to the definition in the Act. Section 61-1-13(15)(a) 
provides: 
"Sale or "sell" includes every contract for sale of, 
contract to sell, or disposition of, a security or 
interest in a security for value. (Emphasis added). 
Notwithstanding respondents' apparent willingness to call a 
chicken a duck, appellant respectfully submits that no reasonable 
mind can seriously contend that under the jj>lain meaning ana 
common usage of the words gift and sale, the gifts of Amenity 
stock were sales to purchasers rather than gifts to donees. 
Pointing out, as respondents have done, th&t as of the date of 
the gifts and respondents1 petition alleging them to be unlawful 
there was hope for ongoing profit from other sources and activi-
ties and that subsequently a portion of such hope became a 
reality, does not change the nature of the| gift transactions. 
There is still no bargain, no contract, no purchase, no disposi-
tion for value, and the recipients of the |stock are still donees 
of gifts, and to hold otherwise would be a violation of the above 
well established and documented plain meaning doctrines just as 
clearly as if it were held that "sell" means "give." 
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Notwithstanding the obviously correct principles and 
authorities cited above, suprisingly enough there have been other 
enterprising litigants who have contended for the strained inter-
pretation respondents would seek to establish. But without 
exception, every time anyone has tried it they have been over-
ruled and their twisted interpretation of the statute disallowed. 
For example, in two Federal cases, Truncale v. Blumberg, 80 
F.Supp. 387 (S.D.N.Y. 1948) and Shaw v. Dreyfus, 172 F.2d 140 
(2nd Cir. 1949), cert, den., 37 U.S. 907, it was sought to 
include gifts in the definition of sales under the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934. Similar arguments were used as in the 
present case, i.e., that the persons making the gifts had 
received some benefit from having done so, such as goodwill, 
loyalty of their executives, etc. These arguments were rejected 
by the Southern District of New York and the Second Circuit, and 
they refused to consider the gifts made in those cases as sales 
within the meaning of §16(b) of said 1934 Act for the same 
reasons stated above by appellant, that is, those courts 
emphasized the natural and plain meaning of the words gift and 
sale and saLd that "to sell or otherwise dispose of" as used in 
the statute could not be inferred to include a gift, Truncale v. 
Blumberg, supra at 39 0. 
For an additional Federal point of view and that the Secur-
ities and Exchange Commission has issued statements consistent 
with the above principles, see Greater Jersey Bankcorp., (Sept. 
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29, 1980) CCH 76,718. This was a "no action letter" of the 
S.E.C. involving a situation where a company proposed to give to 
approximately 50 to 75 persons per year for an indefinite number 
of years, approximately $50 worth of stock each. These shares 
were to be given to employees who maintained perfect attendance 
for a year. The S.E.C. stated that such gi£ts did not come 
within the purview of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1933 
requiring registration of sales. It is significant to note that 
those giftees had to actually do something to earn the gifts 
(perfect attendance) whereas in the present case there are no 
strings attached to the gifts whatsoever, plearly there was a 
benefit to the employer in making the gifts,, but this did not 
make them sales. 
It is not necessary to look to other jurisdictions to see 
the fate of those arguments that have sought to convince appel-
late courts that gifts are sales or that receipt of some benfit 
changes a gift to a sale. The Utah Suprem^ Court considered the 
precise issue of this case in Andrews v. Cfyase, 49 P.2d 938 (Utah 
1935). This case is so precisely in point that a quote from the 
opinion could be substituted for some of the paragraphs in 
appellant's brief as though it had been written solely for that 
purpose. At page 941: 
The stock here involved is not one of the kinds of 
securities which are exempt from the Provisions of the 
Securities Act. Appellant does not contend otherwise. 
What he does contend is that the Act merely regulates the 
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sale of securities and has no application whatever to 
securities which are given away. It will be observed that 
"sale or sell" is defined as every disposition, or attempt 
to dispose, of a security or interest in a security for 
value. The words "for value" are descriptive of, and 
constitute a limitation on, the kind of transactions which 
the Securities Act was intended to regulate. It is a 
cardinal rule of the construction of a statute that, when 
possible, effect must be given to all the language used in 
the Act. If the legislature had intended the words "sale 
or sell" should include "gift or give," it would not have 
limited the former words to such disposals, or attempted 
disposals of securities as are made for value.... Had the 
lawmaking power intended that the Act should apply to 
gifts of securities, it would have been a simple matter to 
have so provided. 
It is to be noted that although the Securities Act referred 
to in the above case is not the identical securities act as is 
presently in use, the key provisions and definitions are the 
same. It is also significant to note that as in the present 
case, the company that gave the gifts of stock to the public did 
so with the hope of receiving some benefit (an even more direct 
benefit than in the present case in that it hoped to receive 
assessments on the stock directly from the persons whom the stock 
was given to). In rejecting the argument of respondent and 
ruling in favor of appellant in that case, the Utah Supreme Court 
relied on the same reasoning stated above in this brief, i.e., 
the plain meaning of the words and that it was not a sale or 
attempted sale because there was no contractual agreement that 
the giftees would pay the levied assessments (even though many 
did pay them voluntarily). At page 942: 
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A mere hope or a n t i c i p a t i o n t h a t the t t a n s f e r e e s of the 
s tock would pay the assessment , i t and when l e v i e d , may 
not be sa id t o be a d i s p o s i t i o n or an a t tempt to d i spose 
of the s tock for va lue wi th in the meaning of the Act. A 
g i f t does not become a s a l e merely because the donor hopes 
t o r e c e i v e something for the g i f t . 
In the p r e s e n t case the g i f t s of C a p i t a l General were given to 
main ta in and e s t a b l i s h goodwil l and provide an ongoing v e h i c l e 
for p o t e n t i a l fu tu re bus ines s with r e spec t to Amenity, I n c . , 
which in f ac t occu r r ed . Likewise , many of the g i f t e e s of s tock 
in the Andrews case paid the assessments as was the hope and 
2 
a n t i c i p a t i o n of those g i v e r s of s t o c k . Bu|t t h a t d i d n ' t 
t ransform those d i s t r i b u t i o n s of s tock froml g i f t s to s a l e s , and 
the wording of the Utah Supreme Court , " . . . h a d the lawmaking 
power intended the Act should apply to g i f t s of s e c u r i t i e s , i t 
would have been a simple ma t t e r t o have so provided" i s s t i l l the 
l a s t word on the s u b j e c t and s t i l l the inescapably l o g i c a l and 
c o r r e c t conc lus ion . 
2 I t is noteworthy that althougn many of the donees paid the assessments, 
the Supreme Court in i t s ruling in the above quoted material from page 942 
mentions only the hope of receiving i t and not the Subsequent actuality of 
receiving i t . This is significant because i t clearly shows that the Utah 
Supreme Court correctly looked at the gift transactions as of the time they 
were made, i . e . , if they were gifts at the time they were made the character 
of them does not change depending upon whether, or the extent to which, the 
hope of the giver subsequently materializes. 
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In discussing this Point I, appellant has cited several 
precedents and authorities, and there are many more to the same 
effect. On the other hand, after approximately a year and a half 
since the first briefs were filed on the question, with subse-
quent hearings and further briefs, respondents have yet to locate 
a single case in any jurisdiction construing any securities law 
where gifts of securities have been held to constitute sales. In 
attempting to do such in the proceedings below, respondents have 
cited the Federal "spin-off" cases, chief among which is S .E.C. 
v. Harwyn Industries Corp., 326 F. Supp. 943 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). 
However, notwithstanding dicta in those cases to the effect that 
for a transfer to be a sale the purchase price or value need not 
flow directly from the recipient of the stock, it is obvious in 
reading those cases that they do not involve gifts in any sense 
of the word. The recipients of stock in those cases were not 
giftees, but they received the "spin-off" stock as a result of 
contractual obligations and contractual rights to receive it, 
that is, they had purchased stock previously which legally 
entitled them to a prorata share of the subsequently distributed 
stock. 
That neither the legislature nor the respondents (prior to 
this case) ever intended §7 to apply to gifts is clear by the 
conspicuous absence of any reference to such, not only in the 
Act, but in the respondents1 own regulations and procedures for 
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registering securities. This is, the respondents' own regula-
tions apply only to sales, and there are no procedures or regu-
lations established for the registering of £fifts. Appellant's 
attempts to obtain a response from the respondents to this 
obvious defect in their arguments have been totally unsatis-
factory. One such response has been that all of the same 
requirements for registration of sales of security would apply to 
gifts and that the same procedure would be used (R. 118, page 
69). It would unduly burden this brief to go into a detailed 
analysis of each of the requirements for registration as adopted 
by the respondents pursuant to the Act to ^how that they all 
contemplate sales and none contemplate gifts, but just one 
example here will be sufficient to establish the error in 
respondents' arguments: 
The respondents' rules place certain \imitations on stock 
dilution following the sales of stock to the public. For 
example, if one pays a dollar for a share of stock, but immedi-
ately after the sale of stock to the public that share is only 
worth 50<j? because of being diluted with otljier outstanding stock 
of less value, then the value of the public stock has been 
reduced by 50% immediately upon sale. The respondents' dilution 
formulas limit the amount of such devaluation that is allowed in 
sales of stock to the public, and they have argued that its 
dilution formulas would apply to petitioner's gifts. But this 
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cannot be done (because the stock can't be devalued below zero, 
the price of the stock to the giftees), and to suggest that it 
could or should is ridiculous. Clearly, respondents1 own rules 
promulgated under the Act as well as the clear purpose of the 
legislature in enacting §7 is to prevent people from losing their 
money by purchasing securities about which they do not have 
sufficient information. In the present case, the donees of the 
stock have paid nothing, and so there is nothing to lose and 
nothing to regulate, i.e., they are not in the class needing 
protection since they made no "investment decision." S.E.C. v. 
Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, at 127 (1953). This is a very 
glaring fact that the respondents have consistently chosen to 
ignore. 
POINT II. RESPONDENTS1 CONCLUSION IN THEIR FINAL ORDER THAT 
APPELLANT'S GIFTS WERE NOT MADE IN GOOD FAITH IS 
UNTRUE AND NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
At the outset of this discussion of Point II, appellant 
would strenuously urge that the question, raised by respondents, 
of the good faith or bad faith nature of the gifts is not a 
proper question for consideration. This is because the authori-
ties and principles cited under Point I, above, exclude all gifts 
from the operation of §7 of the Act, and so it is pointless to 
discuss what type of gift it was. To hold otherwise would be to 
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read into the statute wording that is not there, i.e., the 
statute would read that one must register both sales and bad 
faith gifts. 
That such was not the intent of the legislature is clear, 
not only from the plain wording of the statute which limits the 
operation of the statute to sales for value^ but also from the 
fact that nowhere in the Act is the term "b£d faith gift" even 
mentioned, let alone defined. Surely, if the legislature is 
going to proscribe conduct, it must follow the fundamental rule, 
"that restraints or duties imposed by law must be clear and 
unequivocal." (Basin Flying Service v. PubfLic Service 
Commission, 531 P.2d 1303 (Utah 1975) at pafge 1305). To allow 
respondents to read into the statute that a bad faith gift is a 
sale within the meaning of §7 is no less a violation of the 
established principles and authorities cited under Point I than 
calling any other non-sale for value transaction a sale. Though 
"bad faith gift" may have a negative connotation, and there may 
therefore be reasons independent of the Act that one may wish to 
avoid being accused of it, the simple fact remains that it is not 
defined, no one really knows what it means lor has even heard of 
it before respondents brought it up in thi^ case, and for sure §7 
doesn't say anything about it, let alone ptohibit it. 
Nevertheless, since respondents have relied heavily on this 
fiction in the proceedings below, appellants will discuss it 
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briefly. This has been necessitated by the fact that notwith-
standing the stipulated facts at the initial hearing that the 
gifts were bona fide gifts, and notwithstanding the administra-
tive law judge's finding some months later that the gifts were 
made in good faith, respondents thereafter required further 
hearing on the specific issue of whether the gifts were made in 
good faith or bad faith, and they thereafter concluded that the 
gifts were made in bad faith. Although appellant has strenuously 
urged that such was not a proper question to be determined by 
respondents, appellant would even more strenuously urge that to 
the extent good or bad faith may be in issue, there certainly has 
never been any bad faith on the part of appellant, and that 
respondents1 conclusion to the contrary, which was upheld by the 
District Court, has no basis in fact or evidence in the record or 
otherwise. 
Respondents have emphasized in the proceedings below that 
§61-1-14.5 of the Act places on appellant the burden of proving 
its gifts were made in good faith. Said section says, in sub-
stance, that a person claiming the facts fit within an exception 
from a definition has the burden of so proving. Although good 
faith gifts are specifically excepted under §61-1-13(15)(d)(i) , 
it does not follow that appellant must prove its gifts come 
within said exception. On the contrary, respondents must show 
that appellant's conduct fits within the prohibition of the 
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statute, i.e., that appellant sold securities, before any other 
provisions of the Act, including any exceptions to definitions, 
penalties, or any regulatory power of the respondents at all, 
come into play. And that they cannot do (s^ e Point I, above). 
Nevertheless, assuming for a moment that it is necessary to 
determine whether or not appellant acted in good faith in making 
the gifts of stock, the evidence overwhelmingly supports the 
proposition that the gifts were in fact mad^ in good faith. 
Facts in the record establishing the gifts to have been made 
in good faith are as follows: 
1. The stipulated facts are that the gifts were bona 
fide gifts (page 4, above). 
2. The administrative law judge (concluded that the 
gifts were made in good faith (R. 31). 
[other person 
bad faith. 
pient of the gifts 
ing or provide any 
3. No government witness or any 
testified that the gifts were made in ! 
4. It is undisputed that no recil 
was required to pay anything, do anythl 
consideration (or even accept the gifts). 
5. Testimony indicated a bona filde and good faith 
intent on the part of appellant to benefit the various 
donees (R. 118, pages 24, 25, 31). 
6. Testimony also showed that in furtherance of 
appellant's good faith intent to benefit the giftees of 
stock, it took further action with respect to the 
development of Amenity, Inc. into a viable business, thus jfab < 
118, enhancing the value of the gifts (R. j page 19). 
7. The testimony was undisputed that appellant had 
no intent to violate §7 requiring registration of sales of 
stock, would have been happy to register the gift shares 
had it believed the statute required Registering of gifted 
shares, etc. (R. 118, pages 9, 11, 17f 23, 38, 63). 
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In summary, if the above isn't sufficient to sustain the 
burden of proof that the gifts were made in good faith, appellant 
would ask, "How else does one prove good faith?" The absence of 
any evidence of bad faith ought to be sufficient in itself. 
Nevertheless, the Department of Business Regulation, through 
its Securities Advisory Board and Executive Director, concluded 
that the gifts were made in bad faith (R. 12). In Point I, 
above, it is pointed out that respondents have not been able to 
produce a single case supporting their strained interpretation of 
the statute. Similarly, under this Point II, they cannot point 
to even one shred of evidence in the record that appellant is 
guilty of bad faith. Nevertheless, the structure of respondents1 
Final Order is internally logical in that it states as a finding 
of fact, in substance, that appellant's gifts of stock were done 
with an intent to circumvent or frustrate the registration 
requirements of §7, (R. 11) and then it concludes from said 
finding that having such intent amounts to bad faith (R. 12). 
That would be logical and make good sense if there weren't two 
very glaring and terminal problems, as follows: 
1. There is not any evidence in the record that the gifts 
were made with an intent to avoid the registration requirements 
of §7. On the contrary, the evidence shows that appellant 
investigated the registration requirements with the intend to 
comply with whatever they might be (R. 118, pages 9, 11, 17, 23, 
38, 63). 
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2. It is categorically impossible for anyone to circumvent 
the provisions of any statute when the statute does not prohibit 
the conduct in question. In this case, sin<be §7 of the Act does 
not require the registration of gifts of securities, how can one 
circumvent the Act by giving unregistered securities? It is 
about as logical as saying that one who has deliberately stayed 
within the speed limit to avoid a citation (Ls guilty anyway 
because he has circumvented the statutory requirement that he be 
subject to the imposition of fine for exceeding the speed limit. 
Perhaps it would frustrate any governmental purpose there might 
be to fill its coffers by the collection of speeding fines - but 
have we really gone that far? 
Every day businesses and others review statutory require-
ments on myriads of subjects and purposely keep their activities 
out of the scope of the regulations in ord^r to avoid the expense 
and inconvenience in dealing and complying with them. How is 
that bad faith? Of course it isn't. In other words, what is a 
desire to make a gift (not regulated by statute) instead of a 
sale (regulated by statute) in order to avoid being regulated by 
the statute have to do with the question of good or bad faith? 
This rhetorical question is asked only to illustrate the error in 
respondents' thinking, but it does not represent the facts of the 
present case inasmuch as appellant has beein willing to register 
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the stock if required (R. 17). But even if appellant deliberate-
ly chose gifts instead of sales because it didn't want to deal 
with the registration requirements of §7, it does not establish 
bad faith - only that it stayed within the speed limit. 
The bottom line is this: Respondents have not been given 
regulatory authority over the gifting of stock, but they want it 
and appear to be willing to call a chicken a duck (see Point I, 
above) and make unsupported findings (discussed above) to accom-
plish it. Et is clear that respondents are arguing backwards in 
an attempt to accomplish their goal, that is, they would seek to 
establish the proposition that the lack of registration of the 
gifted stock is in and of itself sufficient to establish intent 
to circumvent, with consequent bad faith, etc., i.e., that such 
lack of registration is the only fact of importance, and from 
such it can be presumed that there was an intent to violate the 
statute requiring registration. That makes sense, of course, 
only if the statute really does require registration of gifts. 
Since it doesn't (see Point I), said argument of respondents' can 
avail them nothing, and the record remains without any evidence 
of intent to circumvent or bad faith, and the only evidence is of 
JSee the bottom of page 68 and top of page 69 of the transcript of the 
January 20, 1987 hearing, (R. 118) where counsel for respondents in his 
closing argument basically admits that the testimony supports good faith 
intent, but asks that the Securities Advisory Panel look behind the testimony 
to what actually happened, i.e., no registration, to establish the real intent 
of appellant. 
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good faith and intent to comply with the law. To hold otherwise 
would render it impossible to give away unregistered stock in 
good faith because no matter how good one's intentions may be, he 
would always be stopped by that unalterable fact that the stock 
is unregistered. Obviously the specific sebtions of the statute 
in question and the Act as a whole could not possibly have con-
templated such an incongruity or unjust reslult. 
In a nutshell, it would appear that respondents' bad faith 
argument is just another attempt to circumvent and frustrate the 
plain meaning and wording of §7 quoted on page 3, above. First 
they say gifts are sales. Then we're told that if gifts normally 
are not sales, certainly appellant's gifts were since they 
intended to obtain some benefit. These arguments being irrefut-
ably disposed of above under Point I, we aife now told that bad 
faith gifts are sales. No one knows what ^ bad faith gift is, 
but fortunately respondents come to the front and tell us that a 
bad faith gift is one that is unregistered (notwithstanding the 
evidence shows good faith). So in this way we find out that 
anything not registered is a sale, and so in effect respondents 
have extended the definition of sales to include gifts contrary 
to the plain meaning of §7 and the many authorities cited above 
in Point I. All of these erroneous, circuitous and lifting by 
one's own boot strap type arguments of respondents are rooted in 
the failure of respondents to fully comprehend that 1) the 
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statute allows them to regulate sales only, and 2) the fact that 
a giver of gifts receives some benefit from having done it does 
not somehow change those gifts into sales, cast doubt on the good 
faith nature of them, or show any purpose to circumvent or 
frustrate laws not applicable to gifts. 
Although the reasons the respondents might have for wanting 
to regulate gifts are not necessarily material to this appeal, 
since motives have been discussed, it might be pertinent for 
appellant to indicate that it believes that not only has the 
legislature failed to allow respondents to regulate the gifting 
of stock, but there are no valid reasons that respondents should 
be allowed to. This is mentioned here because in all of the 
furor and excitement in the arguments and briefs of the respson-
dents, one may get the impression that someone has been hurt or 
lost money or made a complaint, etc. with respect to the 
activities of Capital General Corporation in its stock gifting 
program, or in other words, that maybe "policy reasons" demand a 
closer look at the possibility of adopting respondents1 strained 
interpretations of the statutes than would seem to be indicated 
by the numerous authorities cited above to the contrary. 
In view of the substantial efforts and determination on the 
part of the respondents to put a stop to the gifts, one might 
expect to find some very insidious and very damaging results to 
be evident at this time, approximately two years after the gifts 
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were made. Yet none of this is the case, and no such things have 
even been alleged or claimed by anybody to the best of 
appellant's knowledge. That is, respondents have failed anywhere 
in their arguments or factual presentations to point out any 
examples of losses or even potential losses to anybody. They 
have pointed out in the hearing below that some secondary sales 
in Amenity stock have occurred which might not have been in con-
formity with secondary trading regulations, but they have not 
shown that if such sales were out of compliance how anyone has 
been hurt, or how the respondents would have been able to prevent 
it if the gifts had been registered under §7. 
The point is that if in fact secondary trading regulations 
are being violated in sales by giftees, the situation would be no 
different than if a company that registered sales of securities 
(i.e., complied with §7) failed to comply with the secondary 
l 
trading laws thereafter. Such an issue relates to compliance or 
noncompliance with laws which are applicable only after the 
original stock distribution, and not as part of it. And if 
respondents really believed there were violations of such laws in 
connection with subsequent sales of the gifted stock, it could 
easily have brought their petition to stop the violations based 
on such laws (and they could still do so with respect to this 
company, even now) - no one questions their authority to do 
that. In other words, if there are such violations, respondents 
-30-
have their remedy already in place, and therefore it is wholly 
unwarranted for them to bring this action under §7 (which, 
requires a judicial rewriting of the statute and changing its 
plain meaning). 
In summary, not only have the respondents wholly failed in 
the proceedings below to establish that the gifting program of 
appellant comes within the purview of its regulatory powers, but 
they have not established any advantage to anyone that such be 
the case. There is no statutory or other authority for 
respondents to take the action they did, and there is no public 
benefit from such either. 
POINT III. RESPONDENTS1 FINAL ORDER AND THE ORDER OF THE 
DISTRICT COURT SHOULD BE SET ASIDE AS A MATTER 
OF LAW FOR THE REASON THAT RESPONDENTS EXCEEDED 
THEIR STATUTORY AUTHORITY. 
Respondents have exceeded their statutory authority in any 
event. Respondents1 authority is contained in ^61-1-14(3). 
Appellant's concern with respect to said authority is that said 
section fails to list any criteria upon which the action of 
respondents in issuing suspension orders, such as the one issued 
in this case, are to be based. In considering the entire Section 
14 as a whole on the subject of exemptions, and Suosection (3), 
in particular, on respondents1 authority to revoke exemptions, 
two things are apparent. 
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a. That at least some criteria for exercising the 
authority is implied by Subsection (3), or otherwise there would 
be no need for a hearing (i.e. it does not Appear the legislature 
intended to grant respondents the authority to revoke statutorily 
granted exemptions solely upon their whim oi the moment), and 
b. That, though not specifically mentioned in Subsec-
tion (3), the authority to revoke exemption^ is based on the 
factual question of whether or not the particular exemption 
sought to be revoked is applicable, i.e. authority is granted to 
revoke an exemption when it is determined by respondents after 
opportunity for a hearing that the facts don't fit the claimed 
exemption. 
Respondents seem to agree with a. in that they held the 
hearing and listed grounds, but they apparently disagree with b. 
in that the grounds they listed were appellant's alleged viola-
tion of §7 in making the gifts without registration. Appellant 
asks, "Where does it say that?" 
In other words, respondents have exceeded their authority 
because nowhere in §14 or in Subsection (3)1 of §14 or elsewhere 
is there any statement that exemptions which may otherwise be 
valid under §14 would be rendered invalid because some other 
prior transaction on the same company violated §7. 
To be even more specific, suppose for the sake of argument 
that John Doe, giftee, received his gift of 100 shares of stock 
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in Amenity, Inc. in a gift transaction that was in violation of 
§7. A year later, or 10 years later or at any time, he wants to 
sell the shares based on one of the exemptions described in §14, 
for example, Subsection (2)(a), the isolated transaction exemp-
tion, i.e., John Doe wants to sell it to his brother in a private 
transaction. Here's the point: the acquisition or the gift in 
the first place, perhaps years prior, is a totally separate 
transaction from the subsequent private sale. It is therefore 
very apparent that Subsection (3), though failing to list 
specific criteria within the subsection itself, contemplates the 
criteria listed in the rest of §14, in this illustration, whether 
or not the sale proposed by John Doe to his brother was in fact 
an isolated transaction that complied with Subsection (2)(a). 
There is no basis in the wording of said Subsection (3) to add to 
that criteria the question of whether John Doe had acquired the 
shares in a transaction that had not been registered in violation 
of §7. 
That this is so and can be put to rest forever is shown by 
the fact that under §7 it is lawful to sell securities on an 
either/or basis, i.e., if they are either registered o_£ exempt 
under §14. In other words, it is contemplated exclusively that 
the exemptions described in §14 apply only to unregistered 
stock. Yet respondents are saying the fact the stock is unregis-
tered in this case is the reason the §14 exemptions don't apply -
just the opposite of what the statute says! 
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The fact is undisputed that on June 5, 1986, when the 
respondents filed their petition seeking suspension of all §14 
exemptions, neither John Doe nor any other giftee had sought or 
4 
claimed any §14 exemptions. Only the first} transaction, i.e., 
the gifts, had taken place, and so it can b^ seen that what the 
respondents are attempting to do is forever dispose of any possi-
bility that any giftee might come within any of the §14 exemp-
tions and be able to sell their stock. Appellant believes that 
such is totally unwarranted by the language of the statutes. On 
the contrary, instead of allowing a blanket suspension of all 
exemptions, the statute clearly contemplated only that each 
potential exemption should be considered on its own merits, i.e., 
whether it fits the statutory description of the exemption at 
such time as a particular person or group of persons may seek it 
in selling their stock. 
Regardless of other considerations, ldgically, it would 
appear that there are only two possible ways of interpreting said 
Subsection (3): The first one would be that respondents are 
allowed to revoke exemptions without any grounds or upon grounds 
or reasons of their own choosing. However * if the legislature 
4 
Nor have they since said date, to the best of appellant's knowledge, 
although subsequent to said date there have been sdme trades perhaps on the 
assumption that certain §14 exemptions are applicable. 
-34-
wanted to grant them that much authority there would have been no 
need to require a hearing. The second possible interpretation 
would be that exemptions can be revoked only upon the grounds 
stated in the other portions of the section, i.e., Subsection (3) 
establishes respondents as watchdog as to whether or not specific 
transactions, e.g. in the example given above, the isolated sale 
transaction, really comply with the statutory description of 
such. 
This latter view is the one that makes sense. It doesn't 
make any sense that the legislature would describe by statute 
particular fact situations that are exempt, require an opportun-
ity for a hearing if revocation is sought by respondents, and 
then allow respondents to revoke the exemptions at their pleasure 
or on other grounds totally outside of the statutory descrip-
tion. Yet, that is exactly what respondents1 Final Order has 
done, and if it is upheld, there is no way to remedy it for any 
of the stockholders, not now or 50 years from now, because it is 
a final order based on a fact alleged and existing on the date 
respondents' petition was filed, June 5, 1986 (i.e. the gifts 
having been made without registration), which fact is history and 
cannot change. 
That the arguments of appellant are correct is seen not only 
from the plain wording of the sections of the Act discussed 
above, but also from §§20 and 21. These sections plainly and 
clearly provide respondents with several specific alternative and 
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cumulative remedies for violations of §7, if any there be in the 
facts of this case. These remedies include rescission, fines, 
disgorgement of profits, injunctions, and even criminal penal-
ties. As has been shown under Points I and II above, there has 
been no violations of §7, but certainly it is obvious from the 
statutory provisions themselves that if there had been, it is 
totally improper for respondents to claim any remedies under 
§14(3) which would necessitate a total departure from the statu-
tory provisions. There can be no question but that the legisla-
ture intended violations of §14 (i.e. claimed exemptions that do 
not fit the statutory descriptions) to be brought under §14(3) 
and violations of §7 to be brought under §§20 and 21, and that 
therefore respondents having exceeded their authority under 
§14(3), their Final Order based thereon should be overruled. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant respectfully requests the Court of Appeals to set 
aside and reverse the Order of the District Court and tne Final 
Order of respondent regulatory agencies as a matter of law and/or 
on the basis that it is not supported in the record below. 
Clearly, the fact that Capital General has made numerous gifts of 
stock and expects to gain something by it does not change the 
character of the gifts so that they are sales within the meaning 
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of §7 of the Act. The hold otherwise would violate the plain 
meaning of the English language, numerous authorities cited 
above, the statutory definition of "sale" and long established 
rules of statutory interpretation including those which require 
that if the government is going to prohibit something, it must 
define it and spell it out in plain English. 
In the three points discussed above, appellant has 
established that: 
1. The section of the Act relied on by respondents, §7, 
requiring registration of sales of securities, has no application 
to appellant's gifts of stock. Since the orders entered below 
are based upon the opposite proposition, they must be reversed as 
a matter of law. 
2. Even if §7 were to have been violated by appellant, the 
orders entered below must be reversed as a matter of law because 
the Act does not allow respondents to issue orders revoking 
exemptions based on a violation of §7 but provides for different 
exclusive remedies under §§20 and 21. 
3. The issue of good or bad faith is not a proper issue for 
determination, but is brought up by respondents in an attempt to 
circumvent the plain meaning of said §7. But if it were a proper 
issue, appellant has met its burden of establishing its gifts 
were made in good faith without any intent to violate said §7. 
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In summary, the respondents, who are state agencies, brought 
an action and held hearings (basically before themselves) and 
after three tries finally got the result they wanted, although it 
required making unsupported findings and cqnclusions and twisting 
the words of the statute far beyond their $lain meaning and 
purposes. The District Court summarily upheld respondents1 
actions without listing findings or reasons. Appellant respect-
fully requests the Court of Appeals to review with scrutiny the 
proceedings below, the statutes in question, the numerous 
authorities cited above, etc., and reverse the orders entered 
below for the reasons stated herein. 
DATED this 5th day of February, 1988. 
Respectfully submitted, ^ 
David H. Day » 
DAY & BARNEY 
45 East Vine Street 
Murray, Utah 84107 
Attorney^ for Petitioner 
and AppeJLlant 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that four true and correct copies ot the 
foregoing Brief of Appellant was mailed, postage prepaid, to: 
David L. Wilkinson 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
Steven G. Schwendiman 
CHIEF, ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
William B. McKean 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
TAX & BUSINESS REGULATION DIVISION 
130 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
on this 5th day of February, 1988. 
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ADDENDUM 
Order of September 18, 1987: 
Order of the District Court for Salt Lake County, Judge Pat 
B. Brian upholding the Final Order of Ithe Department ot 
Business Regulation and the Securities Advisory Board. 
Order of February 18, 1987: 
Final Order of the Department of Business Regulation and the 
Securities Advisory Board suspending all secondary trading 
exemptions of the securities of Amenity, Inc. pursuant to 
§14(3) of the Utah Uniform Securities,Act. 
Order of October 28, 1986: 
Recommended Order of J. Steven Eckluncfcl, Administrative Law 
Judge, dismissing the petition of the Utah Securities 
Division seeking suspension of trading of Amenity, Inc. 
stock. 
Order of September 18, 1987: 
Order of the District Court for Salt lake County, Judge Pat 
B. Brian upholding the Final Order of the Department of 
Business Regulation and the Securities Advisory Board. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON #3472 
Attorney General 
STEPHEN G. SCHWENDIMAN #2891 
Chief, Assistant Attorney General 
NICHOLAS E. HALES #4045 
Assistant Attorney General 
Tax & Business Regulation Div. 
130 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801) 533-5319 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
: ORDER 
) 
In the Matter of the : Civil No. C87-2625 
Registration Statement of ) 
AMENITY, INC. : Judge Pat Brian 
) 
This matter was heard before this Court on September 
17, 1987, at 8:00 a.m. The Petitioner was Represented by David 
H. Day while the Respondent was represented by Nicholas E. Hales, 
Assistant Attorney General. Both parties had previously filed 
briefs with the Court outlining their positions. 
The Court, after having heard oral argument, reviewed 
the briefs on file, and examined the record from the 
administrative proceedings, rules as follow^: 
The Final Order of the Utah Security Advisory Board and 
the Executive Director of the Department of Business Regulation 
is upheld. 
DATED this J$_ day of September, 19 87. 
Pat B. Brian 
District Court Judge 
-r/p^-ctUJ (XU^ 
^ ^ OF SALT UKE W 
K DIXON H!M 
8V ~ 16 I T 
DEPOT*' 
Order of February 13, 1987: 
Final Order of the Department of Business Regulation and the 
Securities Advisory Board suspending all secondary trading 
exemptions of the securities of Amenitty, Inc. pursuant to 
§14(3) of the Utah Uniform Securities'Act. 
Utah Securities Division 
Department of Business Regulation 
Heber M. Wells Building 
160 East 300 South 
Post Office Box 45 80 2 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145 
Telephone: (801) 530-6600 
BEFORE THE SECURITIES DIVISION 
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE 
REGISTRATION STATEMENT OF 
AMENITY, INC. 
FINAL ORD|ER 
CASE NO. SD-86-11 
This proceeding was initiated pursuant to a Petition, 
dated June 5, 19 86. A memorandum in support of a suspension or 
trading exemptions was filed by the Division on July 15, 1986. 
On August 12, 1986, Respondent filed a response to the Division's 
memorandum. The Division filed a reply memorandum on September 
2, 1985. On September 25, 19 86, oral argument was heard before 
the Administrative Law Judge, J. Steven Eckl|und. Mr. Ecklund 
issued his findings of fact, conclusions of law and recommended 
order on October 28, 1986. 
On January 8, 19 87, the Utah Securities Advisory Board 
and William E. Dunn, Executive Director of the Department of 
Business Regulation, after careful review of Mr. Ecklund's 
recommencied order, issued an order adopting certain provisions of 
Mr. Ecklundfs findings of fact and conclusions of lawf but 
rejecting the recommended order. The January 8th Order called a 
hearing on January 20, 19 87f for the limited purpose ot receiving 
evidence as to the intent of Capitol General Corporation and its 
principals in their distribution of Amenity stock. We 
incorporate the January 8th Order herein by reference. 
On January 21, at 3:00 p.m. the additional hearing was 
held. The hearing was held before the Utah Securities Advisory 
Board with J. Steven Ecklund, Administrative Law Judgef 
conducting the hearing. Respondent Amenity, Inc. was represented 
by David Day while Petitioner Utah Securities Division was 
represented by Nicholas E. Halesf Assistant Attorney General. 
The Utah Securities Advisory Board and William E. Dunn 
Executive Director of the Department of Business Regulation 
after careful consideration of all the evidence presented by both 
parties at both hearings, and review of the briefs on file, 
hereby makes the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law and Final Order: 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Capital General Corporation has incorporated 
approximately 30 other companies ("companies") and caused them to 
go public by distributing their shares to a wide range of 
shareholders in a similar fashion to Amenity, 
2. In June of 19 86, Amenity Inc. was acquired by Elkin 
Weiss and Companies Inc. Two additional "companies" have also 
been acquired. They are Olympus Enterprises, now Florida Growth 
Industries, Inc., and Y Travel, now H & B Carriers, Inc. 
3. Capital General Corporation wa& instrumental in the 
acquisition of Amenity, Olympus, and Y Travel by the acquiring 
companies. Capitol General received $25,000.00 for the services 
it performed. 
4. The distribution of Amenity stock was done with an 
intent to circumvent or frustrate the purposes of the Utah 
Uniform Securities Act and the registration provisions contained 
therein. 
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Conclusions of Law 
As was concluded in our January 8, 1987, Orderf as a 
matter of law, the term "good faith gift" in the context in which 
it is used, i.e., in the Utah Uniform Securities Act, means a 
bona fide gift of securities given in "good faith"f i.e.f not 
given with an intent to circumvent or frustrate the purposes of 
the Utah Uniform Securities Act andf most relevant to the instant 
case, the registration provisions contained therein. We have 
found that the distribution of Amenity stock was done with an 
intent to circumvent or frustrate the purposes of the Utah 
Uniform Securities Act. As such, we conclude that the 
distribution of the gifted Amenity stock was not done in good 
faith. 
We have previously concluded that the gift distribution 
of Amenity stock was done for consideration, and thus was an 
offer or sale of a security as defined by the Utah Uniform 
Securities Act. The distribution of the Amenity stock is not 
entitled to the good faith exclusion provided by the Act because 
it was not done in good faith. The Respondent has not 
demonstrated the existence of any exemption or exception for the 
Amenity distribution. No registration of the stock has been 
sought or granted. We must conclude that the distribution ot 
Amenity stock constituted the unregistered offer or sale of a 
security in violation of the Act. 
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ORDER 
THEREFORE, pursuant to Section 14 (3() of the Utah 
I 
Uniform Securities Act, it is hereby ordered |that the use of all 
secondary trading exemptions of the securities of Amenity, Inc., 
its affiliates and successors, be and are hereby suspended, 
DATED this !H day of February, 1^87. 
• ' < ^ / / / - ^ 
Keith A. Cannon 
Chairman, 
Securities Advisory Board 
William E. Dunn 
Executive Director, 
Department ot Business Regulation 
Marga/et Wickens 
Member^ 
S e c u r i t i e s Advisory Board 
: V^-: * . V f - s ^ ••%:_.. Kent Btirgen ^ 
Member -~y \ 
Securities Advisory Board 
Hardy 
Member 
Securities Advisory Board 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this ^-C^C- day of February. 1987. I 
mailed, regular mail, postage-prepaid, a copy of the foregoing 
Final Order to David H. Day. Day and Barney. 45 E. Vine St.. 





Order of October 28, 1986: 
Recommended Order of J. Steven Ecklund, Administrative Law 
Judge, dismissing the petition of the Utah Securities 
Division seeking suspension of trading of Amenity, Inc. 
stock. 
BEFORE THE SECURITIES DIVISION 
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
In the matter of the Registration Statement 
of Amenity Inc. 





Nicholas E. Hales for the Division of Securities 
David H. Day for Respondent 
By the Administrative Law Judge: 
The instant proceeding was initiated pursuant to the issuance of a Petition, dated June 5,1986 Thereafter 
counsel for the respective parties agreed to submit the matter on memoranda On July 15,1986, the division filed a 
memorandum in support of a suspension of trading exemptions regarding Respondent's securities On August 12 
1^86, Respondent filed its responsive memorandum. A reply memorandum v^as subsequently filed on September 2, 
1986. 
Oral argument was presented on September 25,1986 before J. Steven Eklund, Administrative Law Judge for 
the department. The Administrative Law Judge, being fully advised in the pnemises, now enters the folio * ing 
findings of fact, conclusions of law and recommended order. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1 Respondent was incorporated on January 7, 1986 in the State of Utah with a capitalization of 
100,000,000 shares of stock at SO 001 par value per share. Respondent's incorporators and directors are Julie 
Harmon, Cynthia Paskett, and Jen Pattersson. 
2 On January 7,1986,1,000,000 shares of stock were issued by Respondent to Capital General 
Corporauon for $2,000. Capital General Corporation is a financial consulting firm, whose officers and directors arc 
David R. Yeaman, Ms. Paskett, and Ms. Pattersson. The monies paid for theistock represent Respondent's only 
asset. 
3. As of the just-stated transaction, Capital General Corporation was the only shareholder of Respondent. 
Thereafter, Capital General Corporation gave 100 shares of the stock it held to each of approximately 900 people. 
Those who received the stock consist of various contacts, customers, former customers, and business associates of 
Capital General Corporation. 
4. No consideration or payment for the securities thus transferred was solicited or accepted by Capital 
General Corporation. Those who received the securities were not required to purchase anything, become a customer 
of Capital General Corporation, or provide any consideration for the securities in question. Capital General 
Corporation distributed the stock to reward past association and loyalty and to provide exposure of Capital General 
Corporation's consulting business to various financial entities as the means of creating or maintaining good will. 
5. Capital General Corporation has previously capitalized three other subsidiaries, caused said subsidiaries 
to become public, and thereafter sold them in mergers with other companies. Respondent's promoters intend to do 
likewise respecting Respondent. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The division asserts that Capital General Corporation's distribution of the stock represents the sale of a 
security within the meaning of Section 61-l-13(15)(a) and that distribution of said securities without registration oi 
the same constitutes the violation of Section 61-1-7, quoted below. The division urges that both the initial and 
subsequent purchasers of a public offering are entitled to the protection afforded by disclosure mandated through 
registration requirements. Thus, the division contends that full compliance respecting both initial registration 
requirements and secondary trading laws must exist and all that possible exemptions from registration requirement ..-
to future trading of Respondent's securities should be suspended. 
In opposition thereto, Respondent asserts that the distribution of the securities constitutes a good faith gii i, 
which is excluded from the definition of a sale of a security by reason of Section 61-l-13(15)(d)(i). Respondent 
contends that the creation or maintenance of good will is not sufficient consideration to conclude that value has 
passed within the meaning of Section 61-l-13(15)(a). Respondent further asserts that registration requirements are 
inapplicable as to the initial distribution of the securities which occurred, inasmuch as the donees of said distribution 
invested nothing and, thus, do not fall within the class intended to be protected by the disclosure afforded through 
registration requirements. Respondent conceeds that any subsequent public trading of the gifted securities is subject 
to applicable secondary trading laws. 
Section 61-1-7, Utah Code Ann. (1953), as amended, provides: 
It is unlawful for any person to offer or sell any security in this state Unless it is registered under 
this chapter or the security or transaction is exempted under Section 61-1-14. 
Section 61-l-13(15)(a) defines "sale" or "sell" to include: 
. . . every contract for sale of, contract to sell, or disposition of, a security or interest in a security 
for value. 
"Offer" and "offer to sell" are deflneu in Section 61-l-13(15)(b) to include: 
. . . every attempt or offer to dispose of, or soliciation of an offer to btky, a security or interest in a 
security for value. 
Section 61-l-13(15)(d)(i) further provides that the above-defined terms do not include a "good faith gift". 
Clearly, the previously-described transaction by Capital General Corporation represented a disposition of a 
security for value within the meaning of Section 61-l-13(15)(a) or (b). Despite Respondent's assertion that there is 
insufficient consideration present to find that value passed to Capital General!Corporation from the donees of the 
securities in question, the creation and/or maintenance of good will and the resulting beneficial exposure of Capital 
General Corporation's business in various areas represents the value envisoned by the just-cited statutes. See 
Blackburn vs. Ippolito. Fla.. 156 So. 2d 550 (1963); King et. al. vs. Southwestern Cotton Oil Co.. Okla. App., 585 
P.2d 385 (1978). 
Thus, the only remaining question is whether the disposition of the securities constituted a good faith gift 
exempted from compliance with the registration requirements set forth in Section 61-1-7 by reason of the 
applicability of Section 61-l-13(15)(d)(i). The division asserts that the transfer of the securities from Capital General 
Corporation to the donees constitutes a subterfuge designed to avoid registration requirements mandated by statute 
and/or rule, the implication being that the transfer was not one made in "good faith". Concededly, the transfer of the 
securities was made to a significant number of entities and the term "good fajth gift" is not defined by statute. 
However, it has been stated that "there is no warrant for superimposing a quantity limit on private offerings as a 
matter of statutory interpretation." S.E.C. vs. Rawlston Purina Co. 346 U.S.i 19,127 (1953). Further, there is no 
evidence that the disposition of the securities by Capital General Corporation was conditioned upon either action or 
inaction of the donees of said securities and the mere fact that value passes upon disposition of a security is not such 
as to necessarily conclude that a good faith gift has not been made. 
A more considered review reveals that the recipients of the securities were mere donees, to whom the 
protection afforded by compliance with registration requirements respecting financial disclosure as to the securities or 
the issuer of the same is not relevant. Clearly, securities laws are remedial in nature and should be broadly and 
liberally construed to give effect to the legislative purpose. Payable Accounting Corp. vs. McKinlev, Utah. 667 
P.2d 15 (1983V Nevertheless, under the facts and circumstances presented, Respondent correctly asserts that the 
purpose generally served by compliance with registration requirements (i.e., protection of the investing public) has 
no applicability as to the donees of the securities in the instant case. 
RECOMMENDED ORDER 
WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the relief sought in the Petition, dated June 5,1986, be denied and 
said Petition be dismissed, there being no proper basis to conclude that registration requirements mandated by 
Section 61-1-7 are applicable to the disposition of the securities in question. 
Dated this Z<6^0^ day of October ,1986. 
